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Although an economic downturn causes hardship for many indi 
viduals, those at the bottom of the income distribution are particularly 
hard hit. Poverty rates typically climb, and many of the newly destitute 
turn to the government for assistance, increasing the costs of safety net 
programs at precisely the time when the slowdown in economic activ 
ity leads to a reduction in tax revenues. Through 1996, the federal gov 
ernment covered at least half of these costs in the main cash assistance 
program, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), and the 
states made up the difference. Sweeping welfare reform legislation 
enacted in that year replaced AFDC, however. The new cash assistance 
program, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), provides 
each state with a federal block grant, the amount of which does not 
depend upon the business cycle.
This new system creates potential difficulties for a state's ability to 
finance benefit payments during a recession. AFDC represented a very 
small share of the federal budget, and cyclical fluctuations in its costs 
were a tiny contributor to the annual budget deficits that ballooned dur 
ing the past two recessions. Because the federal government can easily 
obtain credit on financial markets, financing these additional costs was 
a trivial issue. States, on the other hand, face constraints that the fed 
eral government does not. In fact, many states have balanced budget 
requirements that do not allow them to spend more than the tax reve 
nues they collect. The debate preceding welfare reform recognized 
this problem, and the 1996 legislation created a contingency fund to
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provide additional resources to states experiencing serious economic 
downturns.
This paper will address the burden imposed on states by cyclically 
induced increases in the demand for welfare. The first part will esti 
mate how much states likely will be forced to spend on additional wel 
fare payments in the event of an economic downturn. I use data from 
1976-1996 on welfare expenditures and economic activity in all 50 
states and the District of Columbia and estimate the sensitivity of over 
all (state and federal) welfare costs to a recession. Then I review the 
specific details of the TANF program and the federal contingency fund 
that will determine how these costs will be split between federal and 
state governments. My findings indicate that the financial burden 
imposed upon some states is likely to be quite high because payments 
from the contingency fund will be inadequate to cover the welfare- 
related costs of a recession. Moreover, payments from the fund will 
not commence until well into a recession.
The high burden imposed upon states raises the question of the 
manner in which they will fund these cyclical expenditures. Although 
welfare reform may have been too recent for states to establish mecha 
nisms to address this problem, other state-administered programs, like 
the unemployment insurance (UI) system, have similar difficulties. 
This system has been in place long enough that the experiences with it 
may serve as a relevant example.
The second part of this paper, therefore, examines the financing of 
UI, with particular emphasis on the ability to cover the additional ben 
efit payments that are required during a recession. After providing 
details of the institutional arrangements of the financing system, I 
explore the historical ability of the system to provide adequate 
resources to fund high cyclical expenditures. I then simulate the 
resources required to weather recessions of different magnitudes in the 
future and determine whether current funding patterns are sufficient to 
meet these needs. Unfortunately, the results of this analysis do not 
bode well for many states' abilities to save for a rainy day.
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HOW MUCH DOES A RECESSION COST?
Research addressing the cyclical pattern of welfare activity has 
largely focused on changes in the size of the welfare caseload.' For 
instance, several recent studies indicate that a 1-percentage-point rise 
in the unemployment rate increases the number of people on welfare 
by roughly 4 to 6 percent (Blank 1997; Council of Economic Advisers 
1997; Levine and Whitmore 1998; Blank and Wallace, this volume; 
and Bartik and Eberts, this volume). Although such an expansion of the 
welfare rolls probably will have similar effects on expenditures, the 
cyclical effects may differ somewhat if the composition of the caseload 
changes (towards, say, larger families) or if states impose cyclical 
adjustments in the generosity of their benefits. Therefore, this section 
of the paper replicates a common approach taken to examine caseload 
cyclically, but focuses on actual welfare spending instead.
Specifically, the methodology employed is analogous to that used 
in Council of Economic Advisers (1997) and Levine and Whitmore 
(1998), which focused on explaining trends in the size of the welfare 
caseload. Using federal fiscal-year data from 1976-1996,1 estimate 
OLS regression models of the following form: 2
Eq.l f _ _ 
+ Js + Jt + trend x js + e^,
where
ESit = AFDC expenditures in state s in fiscal year ?,
a = the intercept,
U = the fiscal year unemployment rate,
B =real maximum AFDC benefits in 1996 dollars for a
three-person family,
YS and y, = state and year fixed effects, respectively, and 
e = a residual.
Lagged values of the unemployment rate are included along with the 
contemporaneous level because individuals may exhaust other sources 
of support before turning to the welfare system for help. Because 
Blank (1997) reported that welfare caseload effects hit their peak 18
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months following an increase in unemployment, I include up to two- 
year lags with the annual data available here. The year fixed effects 
capture time-varying factors that affect all states in a given year. Such 
factors might include changes in welfare policy (like OBRA 1981 or 
the Family Support Act of 1988), other changes in policies targeted to 
low-income individuals (like the Earned Income Tax Credit or Child 
Care and Development Block Grant), or changes in national attitudes 
regarding welfare receipt that may have been linked to the welfare 
reform debate. The state fixed effects control for time-invariant differ 
ences among states, such as differences in industrial composition that 
may affect less-skilled workers or attitudes towards welfare recipients. 
A state-specific linear trend is included to capture typically slow-mov 
ing changes in the characteristics of the low-income population, like 
teen and nonmarital birth rates, that may differ among states. 3
Consistent with Blank's findings, I indeed find a lag in the impact 
of a recession on welfare expenditures (Table 1). In the year the unem 
ployment rate begins to rise, no statistically significant effect on expen 
ditures occurs. These effects become significant in the following year 
and even bigger in the year after that (although differences between the 
two lagged coefficients are not statistically significant). To interpret 
these findings, consider a 1-percentage-point increase in the unemploy 
ment rate that lasts at least two years. Summing the three coefficients 
indicates that three years into a recession, annual welfare expenditures 
would have increased by almost 4.75 percent. As expected, benefit 
generosity is strongly positively correlated with expenditures; a 10 per 
cent increase in the maximum welfare benefit yields an identical 
increase in welfare spending.
Table 1 Coefficients for the Effect of Economic Activity on Welfare 
Expenditures3
In of maximum Unemployment rate Unemployment rate Unemployment rate 
AFDC benefit in year t in year t-\ in year t-2
104.8b O511.49**c 2.78** 
(5.25)________(0.45)________(0.59)________(0.42)
a The dependent variable is the total expenditure on welfare by the federal and state 
governments, measured in natural logarithms. Estimates are obtained from a model 
including state and year fixed effects along with state-specific trends.
b Coefficients are multiplied by 100; standard errors are in parentheses.
c **_ signiflcant at the 5% level
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In Table 2,1 apply the estimates from this model to simulate the 
additional welfare costs of a recession based on 1997 spending levels.4 
I consider the additional spending that would be generated by reces 
sions equal in magnitude to the three most recent cyclical downturns. 
Unemployment rates in these recessions peaked in 1975, 1982, and 
1992 at 8.5, 9.7, and 7.5 percent, respectively, providing a range of 
levels of hardship. In each case, welfare expenditures are assumed to 
begin at the 1997 level of about $23 billion in total welfare spending 
before the recession begins. Additional expenditures are calculated as 
the unemployment rate rises from its low point in the first row of the 
table. These calculations are made for the following five years, 
because most of the additional costs resulting from a recession are 
accrued over this period. The costs vary from $6.8 billion to $13.7 bil 
lion in 1997 dollars.
These results must be interpreted with some caution because the 
underlying data cover the 1976-1996 period, in which the welfare sys 
tem was significantly different than it is now in the aftermath of wel 
fare reform. In particular, the emphasis on moving recipients to work 
may increase the sensitivity of welfare costs to the business cycle. To 
the extent that potential welfare recipients are successful in obtaining 
employment during an expansion, these individuals are at a greater risk


































Total five-year costs $11.5 $13.7 $6.8 
(billions of 1997 dollars)3____________________________
a Costs are calculated from year 2 to year 7.
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of experiencing unemployment during a recession and may find them 
selves requesting assistance from the welfare system (Gustafson and 
Levine 1998). 5 This suggests that the estimates in Table 2 of cyclical 
increases in welfare costs are likely to be understated. 6 Nevertheless, 
these estimates provide a basis upon which to evaluate the financing of 
welfare spending in future recessions.
WHO WILL PAY THESE COSTS?
In previous recessions, states were significantly shielded from the 
excess welfare costs during an economic downturn because the federal 
government reimbursed the state according to a formal schedule 
(called the Medicaid matching rate) that mandated higher rates of 
reimbursement for states with lower per capita income. The federal 
government paid half the costs of welfare payments in wealthier states, 
like California and Connecticut, and up to about three-quarters of the 
costs in poorer states, like Arkansas and Mississippi.
Welfare reform replaced this system with one based on annual 
block grants to states. Through the 2003 fiscal year, each state will 
receive a lump-sum payment equal to the amount of federal funds it 
received under the old formula in the 1994 fiscal year (with no adjust 
ments for inflation). Note that these payments are unrelated to the 
actual welfare expenditures made by the state.
Although it appears that state governments will face all additional 
welfare costs brought about by a recession under this block grant, two 
important features of TANF may mitigate these costs. 7 First, the fed 
eral government established a $2 billion contingency fund designed to 
provide resources to states should the economy experience an eco 
nomic downturn. A state may use the contingency fund if its own 
expenditures exceeded the 1994 level and one of the following two 
conditions are met: 1) the state's unemployment rate over a three- 
month period exceeds 6.5 percent and is at least 10 percent higher than 
that in the corresponding period in either of the two preceding calendar 
years, or 2) the state's food stamp caseload exceeds the 1994 or 1995 
level by 10 percent. 8 Once triggered, contingency funds will be used to 
match additional state expenditures at the Medicaid match rate. 9
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Second, some states will enter the next recession with unexpended 
funds allocated in earlier years that can help finance higher cyclical 
welfare costs. The availability of these funds is the result of the decline 
in welfare rolls over the past few years. Nationwide, the number of 
people receiving welfare fell by over 40 percent between January 1994 
and June 1998; the decline in some states was even greater. The num 
ber of welfare recipients in Wyoming and Idaho fell by more than 
three-quarters, and even some larger states such as Florida and Massa 
chusetts experienced about a 50 percent decline. But the 1996 welfare 
reform legislation requires states to maintain spending of their own 
funds on TANF and other welfare-related programs (called "mainte 
nance of effort" or MOE) at between 75 and 80 percent of their 1994 
expenditures. For those states with large declines in caseloads, main 
taining the required level of state spending while using all of the fed 
eral funds allocated to them would force them to spend considerably 
more on each case still on the rolls. Alternatively, states may choose to 
spend less of the federal funds than they are entitled to and save the 
remainder for future needs, such as a recession. Current law requires 
that any unspent funds remain in the federal treasury, but they are ear 
marked for future TANF spending by those states with claims on them.
Unfortunately, these sources of funds will not provide sufficient 
assistance for many states in meeting the higher demand for welfare 
during a recession. Two limitations of the contingency fund will 
reduce its value in helping states. First, the federally matched reim 
bursement system, in essence, replicates the approach used to fund all 
cyclical welfare costs prior to welfare reform, except that the federal 
obligation is capped at $2 billion. Therefore, only a small share of the 
cost of an economic downturn, which I conservatively estimate as $6.8 
to $13.7 billion, will be covered. More importantly, funds from this 
source are only available to states that spend at least as much of its own 
funds as it did in 1994 (i.e., 100 percent MOE). With average state 
caseload declines to date of 40 percent, substantial increases in state 
spending will be required before reaching this level, indicating that 
states may not be able to access the federal contingency fund until well 
into a recession, if at all. As for previously unexpended funds, they 
currently exist only for those states that have experienced very steep 
declines in caseloads. Many states, including California and New 
York, currently have no such funds available.
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These issues are highlighted in Table 3. The number of welfare 
recipients fell by 20 percent nationwide between January 1994 and 
January 1997, while the average decline was only 14 percent in the 10 
states shown. The two largest states, California and New York, experi 
enced relatively small declines of 5.5 and 13.5 percent, respectively. 
Column 2 shows each state's 1997 annual expenditure of its own funds 
for TANK 10 Column 3 shows the amount that each state would have to 
spend to hit 1994 levels and satisfy the 100 percent MOE required by 
the federal contingency fund. The values in column 4 (calculated as 
the difference between columns 2 and 3) represent the shortfall in state 
TANF spending that would need to be eliminated before federal con 
tingency funds could be activated. The last row of column 4 indicates 
that all states would need to increase spending by $3 billion, with addi 
tional spending of $729 million and $562 million required in Califor 
nia and New York alone. These levels are surely higher today based on 
the continuing decline in caseloads in 1998; therefore, $3 billion is a 
minimum figure.
Columns 5 through 7 of Table 3 report the extent to which states 
are spending the federal funds allocated to them. In the 1997 fiscal 
year, about $13.4 billion was awarded to all states and the District of 
Columbia, but $1.3 billion was never spent. This money will be avail 
able in future years to those states in an amount commensurate with 
their balance. However, not all states share in this surplus equally; in 
particular, states with higher welfare expenditures are less likely to 
benefit in the future from current savings. The 10 highest spending 
welfare states saved less than half of the total unspent, even though 
they account for over two-thirds of the federal allocation. Even within 
this group, savings are largely limited to Florida and Massachusetts, 
two of the states in this group with very large reductions in caseloads. 
Of the two highest spending states, California used all of its funds, 
while New York saved less than $100 million (about 2 percent) of its 
annual welfare spending.
The results of this analysis suggest that many states are still likely 
to be responsible for the vast majority of additional welfare expendi 
tures. In states that have experienced very large caseload declines, or 
for those who will do so in the near future, the savings from previously 
unexpended federal awards that have accrued before a recession hits 
may provide a strong buffer from the higher anticipated costs at that
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SOURCE: All of the data was obtained from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (1998).
a TANF expenditures reported in column 2 are computed as full-year equivalents because states had until the end of the 1997 fiscal year
to implement their TANF program. Expenditures of federal funds include unliquidated obligations. 
b Weighted average for top 10 states is 13.9%.
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time. The need for resources from the contingency fund may not come 
until late in a recession, if at all, by the time these states use up their 
unexpended funds and increase their own spending back to 1994 lev 
els. In states that have experienced only moderate declines in their 
welfare caseloads, including many of the largest states like California 
and New York, little will likely be available in the form of previously 
unexpended federal funds. Significant additional state spending will 
be required before money from the federal contingency fund can be 
released, and that money will cover just a small share of the additional 
welfare costs incurred during a recession. These are the states that are 
the most at risk in the event of a cyclical downturn.
FINANCING CYCLICAL COSTS IN THE UNEMPLOYMENT 
INSURANCE SYSTEM
The results presented so far indicate that some states, particularly 
many of the larger ones, will face the burden of paying for a large share 
of the costs of increased welfare benefits during a recession. In these 
states, a state-level rainy-day fund would be required to weather the 
storm without facing the difficult decision of cutting back on welfare at 
a time when it is needed most or finding other sources of funding at a 
time when tax revenues are falling. (Some critics of the 1996 reform 
have expressed concern that the new law may lead states to stop enroll 
ing new cases or to cut benefits significantly when faced with increased 
demands for welfare during a recession.) Although some states have 
already established such funds, few of the large states have done so. In 
addition, the level of savings is small in these funds. 11
Because welfare reform is so recent and states have had no experi 
ence with TANF in a cyclical downturn, it is understandable if states 
are not fully prepared for the next recession. To determine whether or 
not states are likely to learn to effectively manage these costs in the 
long-run, I compare states' experiences with financing another pro 
gram that involves large cyclical cost increases, the unemployment 
insurance (UI) system. 12 Although UI and welfare are very different 
programs with different target populations and institutional arrange 
ments, such a comparison may help gauge states' degree of foresight in
Economic Conditions and Welfare Reform 259
planning for the increased costs of transfer payments during a reces 
sion. Therefore, I will begin by describing the institutional features of 
the UI system and the historical patterns of solvency, and then present 
an analysis of whether or not state UI programs are adequately pre 
pared for a future recession. 13
The UI system pays weekly benefits to individuals with a sufficient 
work history who lose their jobs through no fault of their own. 
Because rates of job loss and the length of time it takes to find a new 
job increase during recessions, the cost of providing UI benefits varies 
with the business cycle in much the same way as welfare costs. The 
financing to pay for these benefits is obtained through a tax on employ 
ers. The federal tax is equal to 6.2 percent of their federal taxable pay 
roll. 14 However, a tax credit of 5.4 percent is available to firms in states 
that have met federal guidelines which require that, among other 
things, states utilize some form of experience rating (i.e., tax rates must 
be lower for firms that lay off fewer workers). Because all states meet 
these guidelines, the de facto federal component of the UI tax is 0.8 
percent of federal taxable payroll. Part of the federal revenues col 
lected in excess of federal administrative expenses goes into a trust 
fund used to finance loans to states whose trust funds have become 
insolvent.
The tax revenue that the states collect is deposited into a UI trust 
fund; fund balances are called net reserves. As the economy expands, 
net reserves typically grow, and they are drawn down during a reces 
sion. A commonly reported statistic that normalizes net reserves to the 
size of the state's workforce is the "reserve ratio," the ratio between net 
reserves and total payroll in the state.
HISTORICAL PATTERNS OF UI TRUST FUND ADEQUACY
Figure 1 displays the reserve ratio aggregated across all 50 states 
and the District of Columbia from 1961 through 1996. 15 As expected, a 
strong cyclical pattern is observed. The reserve ratio grew during the 
expansions of the 1960s, late 1970s, mid to late 1980s, and the mid 
1990s and declined in the years surrounding cyclical troughs of 1971, 
1975, 1982, and 1991. Although savings accumulate during expan-
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Figure 1 Ratio of Net Reserves to Total Payroll
-1 J Year
sions, they have not always been sufficient to pay the greater costs 
incurred during a recession. A large number of states experienced a 
deficit during the 1975 recession and were forced to borrow funds from 
the federal government. Federal funds were available interest free at 
that point, but the extent of borrowing led to 1981 legislation that insti 
tuted interest payments on loan balances. This policy change occurred 
too late to forestall the massive borrowing that took place during the 
recession in the early 1980s; net reserves aggregated over all states 
were in deficit at that time.
UI trust funds weathered the recession in the early 1990s rather 
well compared with the experience of the previous two recessions. 
Several factors may explain this positive outcome. First, the incentive 
to generate a larger trust fund (brought about by interest charges on 
federal borrowing) led states to change their tax and benefit structures 
so as to accumulate greater reserves. Second, the economy underwent 
a lengthy and robust expansion in the mid to late 1980s that generated 
extra revenue through larger taxable payrolls and fewer and shorter 
unemployment spells. Third, the subsequent recession was rather mild 
compared with the two preceding it.
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A final factor that may have led to the maintenance of positive net 
reserves during this last recession is the declining share of unemployed 
workers who collect UI benefits. As shown in Figure 2, throughout the 
mid 1970s, upwards of 60 percent of unemployed workers received UI. 
Through the early 1980s, however, that share fell to about 40 percent 
and has remained roughly constant since then. A substantial literature 
trying to explain these trends over time has found that they may be 
attributable to declining unionization, the changing industrial structure 
of the economy, the taxation of UI benefits, and other factors (Corson 
and Nicholson 1988; Blank and Card 1991; Vroman 1991; Anderson 
and Meyer 1997). Regardless of the reason, the smaller the share of 
unemployed who collect UI, the lower the benefit payouts are. A 
recession of any particular magnitude as measured by total unemploy 
ment will now draw down net reserves in the UI trust fund at a slower 
pace.
Based upon the strong performance of the UI financing system 
from the mid 1980s through the recession of the early 1990s, a puz 
zling trend in the past few years is the rather anemic growth in trust 
funds in the presence of a strong economy. The absolute increase in















the reserve ratio between 1993 and 1996 was considerably smaller than 
that observed in past expansions of this length and size.
In fact, these statistics aggregated over the entire country mask 
even more startling patterns that are seen when looking at individual 
states. Figure 3 displays funding patterns for three larger states (New 
York, Maryland, and Texas). The main cyclical discrepancy between 
these states is the prolonged recession observed in Texas through the 
1980s in response to low oil prices. Nevertheless, by the early 1990s, 
all states had UI trust funds that were at similar levels. Although trust 
funds in Maryland appear to have grown at a rate similar to those 
observed across the nation in past expansions, trust funds in New York 
and Texas have barely increased at all. Not only are their reserves 
growing very slowly, they are also very small in absolute terms, and 
New York and Texas are not alone. Other states like California, Con 
necticut, and Missouri all have reserve ratios below 1, an unusually low 
level for this stage of an economic expansion.
Figure 3 Ratio of Net Reserves to Total Payroll, Three States
—*— Maryland U New York —•— Texas
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ARE STATE UI TRUST FUNDS BIG ENOUGH?
Low levels of reserves do not necessarily indicate that state funds 
are at risk of insolvency in future recessions. States could be respond 
ing to trends in the labor market — like the declining share of unem 
ployed workers who collect UI — which imply that benefit payments in 
future recessions will be less costly than in the past. To examine this 
possibility in more detail, I simulate the drain on UI trust funds 
brought about by future recessions of various magnitudes.
The methodology employed here is similar to that used to estimate 
the costs of additional welfare spending during a recession. Specifi 
cally, I estimate a model of the form:
Eq. 2 RR5 , = a + IUR5 ,PJ + IUR, t _J2 
+ Js + Jt + trend x js + es t
where IUR represents the insured unemployment rate, which equals 
the number of UI recipients divided by the number of employees cov 
ered by the UI system, multiplied by 100. This specification represents 
a reduced form model, as parameters of state UI systems (like tax rates 
and benefit levels) are not included. 16
The results, reported in Table 4, show that unlike for welfare 
spending, the costs of a recession for the UI system begin mounting 
right away. The coefficient on unemployment in year t is negative and 
significant. Individuals who lose their jobs may be less reluctant to 
apply for UI benefits, perhaps because of less social stigma compared 
to collecting welfare, and may not wait to draw down their resources 
before filing a claim. Also, some welfare recipients apply for assis 
tance only after they exhaust UI benefits. Therefore, as soon as job 
loss begins to rise, claims for UI begin to rise. The costs continue to 
mount over the next two years as job-finding rates for the unemployed 
may be slow to recover following a cyclical trough. These results indi 
cate that a 1 -percentage-point increase in insured unemployment rates 
that persists for at least two years will lower the UI reserve ratio by 
about 0.9 percentage points.
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Table 4 Coefficients for the Effect of Economic Activity on the UI Reserve Ratio3
IUR in year t IUR in year t-l IUR in year t-2
-0.314 -0.285 -0.266 
______(0.033)___________(0.043)___________(0.032)_____
a Estimates are obtained from a model including state and year fixed effects along with 
state-specific trends.
The impact of recessions of different magnitudes, based on these 
estimates, is reported in Table 5. The top panel gives the insured unem 
ployment rates before, during, and after the past three recessions. Com 
paring these values with those reported in the top panel of Table 2, 
which lists comparable values for the total unemployment rate, pro 
vides important insights. First, Table 2 indicates that the recession in 
the mid 1970s was less severe than that in the early 1980s. Unemploy 
ment peaked at an annual average of 8.5 percent in the former, com 
pared with an average of almost 10 percent for two consecutive years in 
the latter. Yet structural changes in the labor market and the UI system 
that have led to a smaller share of unemployed workers receiving bene 
fits occurred over this period. As a result, the insured unemployment 
rate in the mid 1970s recession far surpassed that in the early 1980s. In 
1975, the total unemployment rate reached 8.5 percent and the insured 
unemployment rate climbed to 6.1 percent, indicating a ratio of insured 
to total unemployment of over 72 percent; that ratio had fallen dramat 
ically, to 48 percent, in 1982 (4.7/9.7). This comparison highlights the 
importance of the declining share of insured to total unemployment. 
Even though the recession of the early 1980s was more severe, it was 
less costly to the UI system than the previous recession.
The bottom rows of Table 5 reports the estimated reduction in the 
UI reserve ratio that would result based on each of these three reces 
sions. The high ratio of insured to total unemployment in the mid 
1970s recession makes that the most costly: the reserve ratio is esti 
mated to fall by 1.89 percentage points. The early 1990s recession, 
which was relatively mild and followed the decline in the ratio of 
insured to total unemployment, had a considerably smaller effect, low 
ering the reserve ratio by 0.75 percentage points. 17
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Table 5 Insured Unemployment Rates in Past Recessions and UI Reserve Ratio
































Drop in the UI reserve ratio 1.89 1.10 0.75 
at trough
Lower bound of 95% 1.61 0.94 0.69 
confidence interval
Upper bound of 95% 2.17 1.26 0.81 
confidence interval
How would UI reserves weather a recession in the future? In 1996, 
the reserve ratio aggregated over all states stood at 1.43. Therefore, 
even a recession as severe as that experienced in the early 1980s would 
not deplete aggregate UI trust funds. These results suggest that the 
reserve ratio would fall by 1.10, leaving a positive balance of 0.33 
across the country as a whole. Alternatively, based on patterns of UI 
receipt in the mid 1970s, a recession could exhaust the fund, as the 
estimated decline in the reserve ratio of 1.89 is greater than the present 
level. Such an outcome seems rather unlikely, however, under the 
present circumstances. Even if the ratio of insured to total unemploy 
ment reached 50 percent (which has not happened in almost 20 years; 
see Figure 2), the peak insured unemployment rate of 6.1 percent 
recorded in 1975 would amount to a total unemployment rate of 12.2 
percent. Levels of unemployment that high have not been recorded 
since the Great Depression. These results suggest that UI trust funds 
aggregated over all states are likely to remain solvent through the next 
recession despite the relatively low rate of savings throughout the cur 
rent recovery.
This conclusion is somewhat misleading, however, because it 
ignores the variation in current levels of trust fund reserves among
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states. Table 6 presents values of the reserve ratio for all 50 states and 
the District of Columbia in 1996, ranked from lowest to highest. Five 
states (New York, Texas, Missouri, Connecticut, and the District of 
Columbia) have reserves that are low enough that even a mild reces 
sion, coupled with a low ratio of insured to total unemployment (like 
the experience of the early 1990s), would exhaust their trust fund; 
compare their reserve ratios in Table 6 with the 0.75 value in Table 5 
(rightmost column, first row below divider). An experience similar to 
that of the early 1980s would wipe out all savings in four additional 
states, including California. However unlikely it is that the experience 
of the mid 1970s would be repeated, in a nationwide recession of that 
size, more than half of the states' trust funds would become insolvent. 
Regardless of the size of the recession, some of the states that are in the 
most perilous position regarding UI financing, like California and New 
York, are the same ones that might expect future difficulties in financ 
ing cyclical welfare costs.
One additional exercise that may be of interest is to determine the 
states that are very unlikely (with less than a 5 percent probability) to 
experience a deficit in their UI trust fund during recessions of different 
magnitudes. To do this, I constructed 95 percent confidence intervals 
around the point estimates of the effect of the different recessions on 
reserve ratios. The high end of the interval is of most interest because 
it tells us the largest fall in the reserve ratio that we may reasonably 
expect based on past recessions (Table 5, last row). The results indi 
cate that no additional states are at risk or falling into deficit in a mild 
recession, although California is close to the cut-off. In a moderate 
recession (at least in terms of UI receipt) like that of the early 1980s, 
five additional states, including Massachusetts and Illinois, fail to meet 
this stricter test of having sufficient fund reserves. In the most severe 
recession considered, 34 states are at risk of depleting their UI trust 
funds, including all the larger states with the exception of Virginia.
What do these results regarding the UI system tell us about states' 
ability to plan for higher cyclical transfer payments in general and, per 
haps, welfare spending in particular? It appears that a number of states 
have sufficient foresight that they will be able to cover the higher UI 
costs associated with a recession. One may infer that over time these 
states will apply similar thinking in planning for higher cyclical wel 
fare costs. On the other hand, some states exhibit far less fiscal fore-
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Source: U.S. Department of Labor (various dates).
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sight in UI and may not be expected to save sufficient funds to pay for 
higher welfare costs in the event of a recession. Unfortunately, two of 
these states include California and New York, that together account for 
about 40 percent of total welfare spending.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Many states, particularly the larger ones, will be liable for a large 
portion of cyclically related increases in welfare spending. The exist 
ence of the federal welfare contingency fund, which provides resources 
to states during bad times, is designed in such a way that accessing 
these funds will be difficult. States will be required to spend a consid 
erable amount of their own money before federal money can be 
obtained, and then it is only provided on a matching basis. Some 
states will be able to take advantage of federal funds that had previ 
ously been allocated but were unused because of very large declines in 
caseloads. Many of the largest states, including California and New 
York, have experienced more moderate caseload declines, however, 
and have not been able to save much (if any) of their federal allocation. 
In these states, the burden of facing the welfare cost increases associ 
ated with a cyclical downturn largely will be borne by them.
Because the absence of state-level rainy-day funds to cover these 
additional costs may be attributable to inexperience, I considered 
states' ability to establish sufficient fiscal discipline to cover cyclically 
related cost increases observed in the UI system. The record of the UI 
system should not leave one with tremendous optimism that states will 
be able to weather the financial storm that a recession will bring in 
terms of additional welfare spending. In the two recessions preceding 
the relatively mild downturn of the early 1990s, many states exhausted 
their UI trust funds. Although two prolonged recoveries have sur 
rounded the last mild recession, state trust fund reserves are not sub 
stantial and have been growing very slowly over the past several years. 
The fact that a smaller share of unemployed workers collect UI today 
than 20 years ago has helped; funding requirements for future reces 
sions are not quite as substantial as they once were. Nevertheless, any 
thing other than a very mild recession will still cause financial
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difficulties for UI systems in many states. In fact, the larger states like 
California and New York, which are particularly at risk in terms of 
financing cyclically related welfare costs, are among the weakest in 
terms of the financial stability of their UI systems.
Moreover, UI enjoys considerably greater popular support com 
pared to welfare. In light of states' reasonably poor record of financing 
the costs of additional UI spending during a recession, it seems 
unlikely that they will do a better job of accumulating funds to cover 
additional welfare spending. States will, therefore, be faced with the 
reality of raising taxes when such increases are likely to be quite 
unpopular, reallocating funds from other areas of its budget during a 
time of general revenue shortfalls, or cutting benefits precisely at the 
time that need will be the greatest.
Alternatively, states may be playing a sophisticated game of 
"chicken" with the federal government in much the same way that they 
do in the UI system. During periods of high unemployment, job seek 
ers are much more likely to exhaust their UI benefits simply because 
jobs are not available. States could accumulate greater reserves in 
anticipation of this and extend the maximum benefit duration to help 
compensate those unable to find work, but they do not do this. Instead, 
they wait for the federal government to provide extended benefits at no 
cost to the states, which it has done in virtually every recession in the 
past 40 years. 18 The fact that states like California and New York seem 
destined to face a shortfall of welfare funding when a recession occurs 
may simply indicate that they are anticipating a bailout by the federal 
government. Even if states win at this game, the victory will not come 
without costs. Based on the track record of the UI system, when addi 
tional welfare funding is provided by the federal government in an eco 
nomic downturn, this assistance is likely to be poorly timed, com 
mencing months or years after a recession begins. In the interim, states 
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1. Boyd and Davis (1998) estimated the effect of a recession on welfare expendi 
tures, but they assumed that costs per case remain constant and applied previous 
estimates of the sensitivity of the welfare caseload to changes in unemployment.
2. These regressions are weighted by the state population in each year to yield 
parameter estimates that are representative of the entire country.
3. If differences among states over time are nonlinear, they will not be captured by 
these trends and, if these differences are correlated with the unemployment rate, 
the estimated effect of the business cycle on welfare expenditures will be biased.
4. The level of spending used here is based on 1997 full-year equivalent state TANF 
expenditures, as well as state expenditures of federal block grant funds as reported 
in columns 2 and 6 of Table 3. For additional details, see the discussion of that 
table and its notes.
5. This effect may occur even if employment gains do not generate caseload 
declines. If welfare recipients are successful in gaining part-time employment 
that reduces, but does not eliminate, their need for public assistance during an 
expansion, an economic downturn will likely increase their level of need.
6. In the somewhat more distant future, a countervailing effect may occur as more 
and more people reach their lifetime limit on benefit receipt and will not be able to 
return to welfare when the economy turns down.
7. A report by the U.S. General Accounting Office (1998) provides more detail on 
the institutional arrangements discussed here.
8. The exact requirements that must be met before contingency fund money may be 
released to a state are actually somewhat more stringent. Welfare reform legisla 
tion allows states to use their own funds to establish welfare-type programs out 
side the scope of the TANF program. States that spend at least 75 to 80 percent of 
their fiscal year 1994 expenditures on TANF and these other programs are in com 
pliance with federal guidelines. To access the contingency fund, however, states 
must spend at least 100 percent of their 1994 expenditures on state TANF pro 
grams only, not including state spending on these other programs.
9. Payments from the fund are limited to 20 percent of the state's grant for that year.
10. Welfare reform legislation allowed states until the end of the 1997 fiscal year to 
institute their own TANF programs; therefore, reported TANF spending for 1997 
only reflects the portion of the year following each state's implementation. For 
purposes of comparison, all 1997 state expenditures reported here have been con 
verted into " full-year equivalent" spending.
11. The U.S. General Accounting Office (1998) reports that among 10 states surveyed 
(California, Colorado, Connecticut, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, New York, 
Oregon, Texas, and Wisconsin), only Colorado, Maryland, Texas, and Wisconsin 
have created state-financed rainy-day funds specifically targeted to cover cycli-
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cally related welfare expenditures. In each case, the amount saved represents only 
a few percent of annual operating costs.
12. Vroman (1995) also used the UI system to draw lessons for funding welfare pay 
ments in an environment with federal block grants.
13. Vroman (1998) provided an alternative treatment of the topics addressed here and 
arrived at similar conclusions.
14. For additional discussions of UI financing issues, see Blaustem, Cohen, and 
Haber (1993), Levme (1997), Miller (1997), and Miller, Pavosevich, and Vroman 
(1997).
15. When the current UI system first began operating in the 1930s, pessimistic actuar 
ial assumptions based on unemployment patterns from the Great Depression and 
the full employment economy generated by World War II led to a very large sur 
plus in state trust funds. Through the 1950s, states increased benefit generosity 
without increasing tax liabilities to bring down these surpluses. Because of these 
events, trust fund reserves did not begin to show the expected cyclical sensitivity 
until the 1960s, so the analysis reported here uses data beginning in 1961. All UI 
data was obtained from the U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training 
Administration.
16. I have also estimated alternative specifications that include these program param 
eters and obtained similar results to those reported. Although any exercise that 
includes parameters such as these runs the risk of introducing a "policy endogene- 
ity" (policy responding to market conditions), the problem is particularly severe in 
UI. For instance, many states have tax schedules that depend upon the level of 
reserves in the state's UI trust fund. As reserves fall, scheduled tax rates rise, 
making identification of the effect of taxes on reserves difficult For this reason, I 
have chosen to report the more parsimonious specification.
17. These findings are based on point estimates and do not take into consideration the 
fact that a standard error is associated with the estimated effect of a recession on 
the UI reserve ratio. Because these parameters are estimated with some error, a 
state with, say, a reserve ratio of 0.9 may still run out of funds in a mild recession 
(like that of the early 1990s) that is estimated to reduce the reserve ratio only by 
0.75
18. A formal federal system of extended benefits has been in place since 1970, but 
changes in the labor market have made it virtually impossible to activate these 
additional payments (Woodbury and Rubin 1997).
272 Levine
References
Anderson, Patricia and Bruce D. Meyer. 1997. "Unemployment Insurance 
Takeup Rates and the After-Tax Value of Benefits." Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 112(3): 913-938.
Blank, Rebecca M. 1997. What Causes Public Assistance Caseloads to 
Grow? NBER working paper no. 6343, National Bureau of Economic 
Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts, December.
Blank, Rebecca M., and David E. Card. 1991. "Recent Trends in Insured and 
Uninsured Unemployment: Is There an Explanation?" Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 106: 1157-1189.
Blaustein, Saul J., Wilbur J. Cohen, and William Haber. 1993. Unemploy 
ment Insurance in the United States: The First Half Century. Kalamazoo, 
Michigan: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
Boyd, Donald J., and Elizabeth I. Davis. 1998. "Welfare Reform and Expen 
diture Pressures in the Next Recession." National Tax Association Pro 
ceedings - 1997, Washington, D.C.: National Tax Association, pp. 3-14.
Corson, Walter, and Walter Nicholson. 1988. An Examination of Declining 
UI Claims during the 1980s. Unemployment Insurance occasional paper 
no. 88-3, U.S. Department of Labor, Washington, D.C.
Council of Economic Advisers. 1997. Technical Report: Explaining the 
Decline in Welfare Receipt, 1993-1996. Washington, D.C.: Council of 
Economic Advisers, May.
Gustafson, Cindy, and Phillip B. Levine. 1998. Less-skilled Workers, Welfare 
Reform, and the Unemployment Insurance System. NBER working paper 
no. 6489, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachu 
setts, March.
Levine, Phillip B. 1997. "Financing Benefit Payments." In Unemployment 
Insurance in the United States: Analysis of Policy Issues, Christopher J. 
O'Leary and Stephen A. Wandner, eds. Kalamazoo, Michigan: W.E. 
Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, pp. 321-364.
Levine, Phillip B., and Diane M. Whitmore. 1998. "The Impact of Welfare 
Reform on the AFDC Caseload." Proceedings of the National Tax Associ 
ation Meetings, 1997. Washington, D.C.
Miller, Mike. 1997. "Appendix to Chapter 8: The Role of Federal Financing 
in the Unemployment Insurance System." In Unemployment Insurance in 
the United States: Analysis of Policy Issues, Christopher J. O'Leary and 
Stephen A. Wandner, eds. Kalamazoo, Michigan: W.E. Upjohn Institute 
for Employment Research, pp. 355-361.
Economic Conditions and Welfare Reform 273
Miller, Mike, Robert Pavosevich, and Wayne Vroman. 1997. "Trends in 
Unemployment Benefit Financing." In Unemployment Insurance in the 
United States: Analysis of Policy Issues, Christopher J. O'Leary and 
Stephen A. Wandner, eds. Kalamazoo, Michigan: W.E. Upjohn Institute 
for Employment Research, pp. 365-421.
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. 1998. Temporary Assis 
tance for Needy Families (TANF) Program: First Annual Report to Con 
gress. Administration for Children and Families, Office of Planning, 
Research and Evaluation, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
August.
U.S. Department of Labor. Unemployment Insurance Financial Data (ET 
Handbook 394), 1983 and annual supplements, Washington, D.C.: Govern 
ment Printing Office.
U.S. General Accounting Office. 1998. Welfare Reform: Early Fiscal Effects 
of the TANF Block Grant. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
August.
Vroman, Wayne. 1991. The Decline in Unemployment Insurance Claims 
Activity in the 1980s. Unemployment Insurance occasional paper no. 91-2. 
U.S. Department of Labor, Washington, D.C.
Vroman, Wayne. 1995. "Rainy Day Funds: Contingency Funding for Welfare 
Block Grants." In Welfare Reform: An Analysis of the Issues, Isabel V 
Sawhill, ed. Washington D.C.: Urban Institute.
Vroman, Wayne. 1998. Topics in Unemployment Insurance Financing. 
Kalamazoo, Michigan: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
Woodbury, Stephen A., and Murray A. Rubin. 1997. "The Duration of Bene 
fits." In Unemployment Insurance in the United States: Analysis of Policy 
Issues, Christopher J. O'Leary and Stephen A. Wandner, eds. Kalamazoo, 
Michigan: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, pp. 211-283.
